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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HENRY CHILD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
COY J. HALWARD and 
ALDIN 0. HAYWARD, 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 9082 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Decree of the 
Second Judicial District Court for Davis County, 
State of Utah 
Before the Honorable Charles G. Cowley, Judge 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action for rescision, or in the alternative, 
for the reasonable value of a tract of real property, and 
determination of a property boundary line based on a 
uniform real estate contract between the parties. 
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, DISPOSITION lN LOWER ~COURT .. 
T4e~ case w~s tried:- to.: the Court. From a decree based 
on a_ motio~ · for suml;nary judgement on behalf of the 
. De.~en_sfants,_ ~enyfng Plaintiff's petition. for a rescision 
· and , granting to . the Defendants a decree in the nature 
of ,srecific ·performartce, ordering the conveyance of real 
· prop~rty which is the ·subject matter of this· action, and 
determining boy.ndary of~ real property, the Plaintiff 
appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
. The Plaintiff seeks a reversal as a Matt~r of Law of 
·the· decision of the trial Court, that the matter be referred 
· 'to the trial Court for a continued hearing of evidence of 
· the Defendants and that judgement be entered at the time 
·giving due consideration to the points of Law hereinafter 
·set forth. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At an undertermined date, but prior to the execution 
of the unifo.r~ real estate contract herein, the Defendants 
~ontemplated ol?taining .land located at the corner of Or-
. chard Drive and Virg~nia Lane in Davis County, Utah, 
,for the purpose of construction of a market. (T-9, T-10 
and T-49) The Defendants have another market in 
Bountiful, and they contemplated expansion. (T-13) At 
some time between the conception of their plan and the 
expansion, they decided to lease to Mayfair Markets. 
(T-63, T-64) It was in an effort to put together a land 
block large enough to support a super market that the 
Defendants entered into the negotiations which resulted 
in the uniform real estate contract before the Court. (Ex. 
D-1, T-9, T-10) Sometime in February or March,. 1958, 
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at an undetermined time (T-12), the Defendant Aldin 
Hayward began to negotiate with the Plaintiff Henry 
Child for the purpose of purchasing a strip of land located 
to the east of other land which had been obtained for the 
purpose above mentioned. (T-11, T-71) Plaintiff Child, 
during the course of these negotiations, had refused to 
sell, and had indicated that he had no desire to sell. (T-72, 
T-156) Then on a certain evening, the date of which is 
unknown, but probably in March of 1958 (T-78), Aldin 
Hayward approached the Plaintiff Henry Child, and told 
him that he had a house to move off the corner near 
Orchard Drive and that he needed a place to which he 
might move the house. (T-72, T-73) The Defendant Aldin 
Hayward asked Plaintiff Child to sell him a piece of 
ground to which this house might be moved. (T-37, T-38) 
On this occasion the Plaintiff agreed to a transaction in-
volving a tract of land measuring 122 feet by 209 feet, 
being rectangularly shaped and being 122 feet east and 
west and 209 feet north and south. At this time the Plain-
tiff specifically told the Defendant Aldin Hayward that 
he would not sell the South 122 feet of this tract, either 
to the Defendant Aldin Hayward under any circum-
stances. (T-73, T-73, T-75, T-156) Having come to a tenta-
tive agreement, the Plaintiff and the Defendant Aldin 
Hayward got into the Defendant's automobile and drove 
to Bountiful where they consulted with Defendant's 
attorney, Wendell Hammond. (T-26, T-48) Wendell Ham-
mond drafted a memorandum agreement which embodied 
the general terms as agreed upon by the parties. T-26, 
T-40, T-41, T-50, T-75) Plaintiff and the Defendant had 
not gone over the tract on this specific evening when the 
memorandum was signed. (T-43) At the time the memo-
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randum was signed, $100.00 (Ex. D-2 was paid by Aldin 
·Hayward by check to Henry Child T-15, T-16, T-17, T-25) 
The date of this meeting has not been established. A copy 
of the memorandum ~greement was never given to the 
Plaintiff Henry Child, and the Defendant's copy has been 
reported as lost -or destroyed. (T -17, T -43) Defendant 
Aldin .Hayward reports that he never saves his personal 
checks. (T-43) It was therefore impossible to _establish 
the exact date of the memorandum agreement. 
, ,. Either simultaneously with the negotiations. for the 
purchase of the Plaintiff's property or shortly thereafter, 
the Defendants negotiated with Eugene Child, estranged 
son of the Plaintiff, and. obtained an agreement (Ex. D-9) 
which would eventually· give the Defendants the property 
the Plaintiff had reserved for his son. (T-29, T-30, T-43, 
T-44 T-60 T-61 T-63 T-66 T-130 T-131) 
' ' ' ' ' 
The date of the document (Ex. D-9) by which De-
fendants obtained an interest from Eugene Child was 
placed at April 9, 1958, by the Defendant Hayward. It 
must be noted, however, that the date is fixed only by a 
notation at the top of Exhibit D-9 which was made at 
another time from the time of its execution, and with a 
different pen. (T-30) 
Some weeks after signing the memorandum agree-
ment, a uniform real estate contract was prepared and 
Plaintiff met with Defendant's attorney, Wendell Ham-
mond, for the purpose of executing that agreement. ··At 
that time the Plaintiff was not satisfied with the uniform 
real estate contract which had been drawn up by Wendell 
Hammond, counsel for Defendants, and he insisted that 
a better description be used. (T-27, T-51) The new de-
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scription was .. prepared. by De(endapt~s- cou~el, Wenqell: 
Hammond. (T -59) -After whi-ch d~scriptie:p., · t~e. Plaintiff 
insisted that the words: · · :.~ ;:;;J~. 
"All of this said tracf lies west·of· a line continuing 
north from- the cement wall on tne east·part .of the 
· adjacent Eugene Child tract." ,. -
··be ·added to the cOntract in order to ·make· sure-tha-t ari~ 
other survey description would not be ::used··whi~h: would 
place the boundary line far east of th~ poiht which'would 
encompass 122 feet actually described. :There _was also 
added to the contract, at the req~est ofthe Plaintti;l: Henry 
Child, the following words:. . · ·.. . · ·. ·· · . . · 
"When Buyers receive. De.ed from Seller,;. they 
agree to convey to Eug~ne·~}_lildth:e sou~h ~5 fee~ 
of said tract by 122 feet. east and west ·without 
compensation therefor."· (T-27, T-60) 
The revised contract (Ex. D-1) was then signed.by Henry 
Child and by Aldin Hayward on June 2, 1958. At the same 
time, a check in the amount of $40Q·~OO for the balance of 
the down payment was made payable to Henry Child, 
Plaintiff. (T-45, T--80) The description finaJly:tisea on the 
real estate contract was selected by Wendell ·Hammond, 
counsel for Defendants. (T-79) ·Plaintiff never did refer 
to boundaries on the ground and W endeli Hammond, 
Defendant's attorney; provided the terms that the "entire 
tract being conveyed would lie west of the cem~nt wall 
marking the· eastern boundary of Eugene -Child's. prop-
erty." (T-79, T-115, T-116) The Pla~nt~ff .,·all~g~d ~t ... all 
times that he was selling 122. f~.et.meas1fred from the west 
boundary of his property to the ~~~t .. 
The Plaintiff Henry Child discussed the reservation 
of the 45 feet by 122 feet for the use and benefit of his son 
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Eugene Child· with the Defendant Aldin Hayward and 
with Defendant's counsel, Wendell.Hammond, at the time 
. J 
of the Memorandum. It was also discussed two or three 
times during· the preparation of the uniform real estate 
contract. The reservation was also discussed once when 
the uniform real estate. contract was prepared and not 
signed and also again at the time -of final execution. (T -62, 
T-64, T-65, T-56, T-170, T..;78) During all of these en-
counters bet,Neen the Defendants andjor Defendant's 
counsel and the Plaintiff, all of which were before signa-
ture of the final uniform real estate contract entered into, 
the Defendants never took the trouble to advise Plaintiff 
of.the agreement to purchase the 45 foot by 122 foot tract 
from Eugene Child. {T-62, T-64, T~65, T-78, T-156, T-66, 
T-67; T-170) ·A-ldin Hayward·testified 
Quoting from Page 32 of. the Transcript: 
Q You knew the contents of the uniform real 
estate contract? 
A It was discus~ed that evening. 
-
. Q You knew about this paragraph which refers 
to this 45 feet by 122 feet which was to . be 
conveyed to ·Eugene Child? · 
A That's right. 
Q An~ you didn't at that time advise Mr. Child 
that you had arranged to _purchase this land 
from Eugene? 
A. Mr. ·Child knew that I was negotiating with 
this. Mr. Child knows that I tried to get the 
Child boys and later him to buy the Williams 
home and move in this area on lots· east of 
Eugene's. 
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Q Mr. Hay~ar~, you are not being entirely re-
sponsive to my question. I have asked you if 
you in any way made Mr. Harry-Uenry Child 
aware of the existence of this agreement at the 
time you signed this contract? I think that can 
be answered yes or no. 
A I can say that Mr. Child knew that I was nego-
tiating with these people for all this land be-
fore the agreement was signed. I think this was 
very well understood by him. Well,,· what I 
want to ask is how I could move a home up 
onto there if there wasn't some type of negoti-
ating on it. 
_ Q. Mr. Hayward, I am sure you will have an op-
portunity to ·explain everything that your at~ 
· torneys will want to bring out in this case. At 
the present time, I would like to ask you to 
. restrict your answers to that which is in re-
sponse to the question. I would.liketo··ask you 
again whether or not at the time this uniform 
real estate contract was signed, you in any 
way made Mr. Henry Child aware that you 
had· negotiat~d an agreement· with·. -Eugene 
Child to take that land? 
A Yes, I think Mr. Child knew· that we were 
negotiating on this land. 
(Recess) 
Q Mr. Hayward, at the time you signed the uni-
form real estate contract, had you. advised Mr. 
Henry Child,. the Plaintiff, that you had en-
tered into an .agreement to purchase this 45 
by 122 foot tract from Eugene Child? 
THE COURT: You can answer it yes or no. 
A Let me say that I think that his son-he was 
living with his son Brandt, and Brandt was go-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
· ing· back -and forth with Eugene and Wallie. 
And I rather .think that if there was any dis-
cussions in advance or so, that he knew every-
thing that went on. 
- -
MR. P 1,\.CE: -:You Honor, I will ask to have the wit-
ness instructed to answer the question yes or no. 
·THE COURT: Yes. You can answer the question 
yes or no. 
A I don't know. 
Further, Mr. Hammond, Defendant's attorney, testi-
fied concernir;tg the paragraph with respect to the 45 by 
122 foot tract of land as ts found o_n -Page 60 ·of the Record 
as follows: 
Q Now. I presume ~hat this paragraph was put in 
this contract under direction in your office? 
A I did it myself . 
. Q Could you tell me, Mr. Hammond, who it was 
that i~str~cted_ you that this paragraph or a 
similar paragraph should be included in the 
contract? -
A Well, my recollection is this. That we discussed 
it. We discussed it more tha..11. once in r~gard to 
a variety of things in that regard. And it's my 
recqllectiori that t}lat was just agreed upon be-
.. tween the parties. That is, Aldin Hayward and 
Harry· Child. That that was what was under-
stood. So I put it in according to their instruc-
tions. It was something-! don't think Harry 
directed it at all. It was just agreed between 
them that that would be done, so I inserted it 
like that. 
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Wendell Hammond, counsel for Defendants again 
testified as found on page 66 and 67 of the record: 
Q And so am I correct then that all three parties 
were present when_it.was signed-Coy Hay-
ward, AI~ ~ayward_ and Henry Child? 
A: Yes. But not all signing at the same time. But 
when ·it- was finalized, they were all present. 
Q. Had. Ha_rry signed previous to this? 
A Yes. That's my recollection. 
Q And then it was taken down and Coy Hayward 
and Aldin Hayward together in your presence 
and in Mr. Child's presence then signed the 
contract; is that correct? 
A Yes, when Mr. Child was given the payment 
there. 
Q Do you recall as they signed this contract or 
any time in your negotiations -in getting it 
signed, do you recall whether or not either 
one of the Haywards advised Mr. Child that 
. they .had a contract to purchase this land from 
Eugene Child? 
A It wasn't a point that came up. 
Q They didn't· volunteer this information? 
A It wasn't a point that came up whatsoever, as 
I recall. 
Q Was it ever mentioned to your knowledge in 
any of the negotiations in which you were 
present with the Haywards and Mr. Child? 
• 
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-. A: Well, I -J.mew of it and. talked to Harry about it. 
·Q ·'Yes?· 
: A I don't recall when first. I did, though. 
·Q· -~Is "it your testimony that you· talked to Mr. 
Child about the agreement that the Haywards 
had wi~h Eugene Child; is that correct? 
A · Well, ju~t what dC?you mean by that? 
J 
Q ·Well, I am referring to t;his. You. just men-
tioned, Mr. Hammond, and I am just trying to 
get this clear. You just mentioned that you 
knew about the existence of this contract? 
·A . Yes. 
· Q And-yo4 mep.tio_ned that you had discussed it 
with- Harry Child? · 
A Yes. 
Q . I was wondering, 'did you-. was this discussed 
with H~rry <:;hild before or after signing these 
contract? · · 
A Well, I -.really· don't recall.· You- see there is 
:quite ·a ·bit :of· time elapsed when we signed 
· that memorandum ·.and_ when the other was 
finally signed-_ ·~ever~l _. weeks elapsed. 
Q Wo_uldn't it be true that the first tim~ you d~s­
cuss~~ it witp _Harry Child was when he c~e 
· · into your office and brought the· matter up, 
when he had~ somehow obtained the informa~ 
tion about this contract? 
,_ 
A It might have been because 1 thought-then that 
all that Harry wanted_ was for Gene to have· 
this so he could make up for what had hap-
pened between them before, and I just some-
how took that for ·granted that he just wanted 
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to make up in some way for things that had 
happened before in their troubles. 
Plaintiff Henry Child testified referring to the time 
of the final execution of the contract, as found on Page 
170 of the record: 
· · Q All right, Mr. Child, at any time, did either 
·Coy Hayward or Aldin Hayward tell you they 
were negotiating. to purchase that 45 by 122 
foot strip of land? 
A No. 
On March 26, 1959, an additional payment of $580.00 
was made to Plaintiff Henry Child by Coy Hayward as 
. . 
the first anniversary payment on the contract. T-80, T-81, 
T-142, T-143) Plaintiff Henry Child stated that at that 
. . 
time he accepted the first anniversary payment but pad 
some misgivings about whether or not the contract was 
being honored by the Defendants. (T-80, T-81, T-168) 
because he had noticed that the Defendant had not moved 
a house onto the property which he in<Ucated was his 
purpose for the purchase. (T-82, T-140, T-141) Not long 
after the first anniversary payment was made, the Plain-
tiff noticed that excavation work was being done on that 
portion of real property which he had reserved in the 
uniform real estate contract for delivery to his son. T-82, 
T-141) He noticed that tqere was some excavation work 
being done and that a water pipe was being moved from 
that property. (T-82) At this time he approached Mr. Coy 
Hayward at his store and told him that what was being 
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dope with· his property was not according .. to the agree-
ment at all and that .he wanted to· return.the money paid 
and take the property back. (T-99) He was told that if 
he ·had ·any complaints ·he should go to the attorney of 
the Defendants. Plaintiff did -go to Defendant's ·attorney, 
Wendell Hammond. (T-100) On that occasion and on 
subsequent occasions on which attorney Wendell Ham-
mond and_ Plainti~ Henry ·Child talked; they discussed 
the agreements of ·the Haywards to convey the 122 by 45 
foot tract to Eugene Child. Wendell Hammond indicated 
that this might_ have been the first time the matter of the 
purchase from Eugene Child was discussed with the 
Plaintiff. This time being w;hen the Plaintiff _came into his 
office after having evidenced his ·dissatisfaction at the 
handling of the property. (T~67) As 'is pointed out above, 
at no time prior to the final execution of the uniform real 
estate· contract .. did attorney Wendell Hammond indicate 
that he had mentioned to the Plaint~ff t:Qat the Defendants 
H~yward had in fact obt~ined_a .contrq.ct ?etween them-
se~v~$· and Plaintiff's son,. _Eugepe Child, to buy the tract 
me~sur~ng_ 4!5 by 122 feet ~rom_. ~ugene Child .. Although 
Aldin Hayward claims that Henry ChiJd, the PlainJiff, 
knew that the Hayw-ards were negqtiati~g with all prop-
erty holders in the are~ .. Henry C.h~ld was never directly 
told by the Defendants qf ,their attorney that they in-
t~nded to p:urchas~ this property from Plaintiff's son, 
Eugen~ _Child. (r-62, T~_64, T-_65, T-66, T-67, T-32, T-170) 
And that they in fact had ent~:red into negotiations with 
Eug~ne Chil4 and ~ad obt~i~ed prior to the sigili:p.g of 
the uniform real estate contract the document known as 
Defendant's Exhibit 9. (T-104) . 
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Grant Nielsen testified as an- appraiser that the value 
ofthe 122by 209 foot tract was in the amount of $13,000.00 
in 1958_. (T-86) He also stated that this figure was arrived. 
at based on a value of 50c per square foot. (T-98) 
The Pla~ntiff appeals from the judgement of the 
Court requiring specific performance of the uniform 
re~l estate contract and determining the eastern bound-
ary of the property to be an extension of the cement wall 
forming the east boundary of the Eugene Child tract. 
ARGUMENT. 
Point 1. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PLAIN-
TIFF A DECREE OF RESCISION OR COMPENSATION 
FOR THE 45 BY 122 FOOT TRACT OF LAND. 
A. FACTS PRESENTLY BEFORE THE COURT 
SHOW A CONSTRUCTIVE MISREPRESENTATION 
UPON WHI~H A RESCISION MAY BE BASED. 
B. FACTS BEFORE THE COURT SHOW THE 
CREATIO-N ,OF A CONSTRUCTIVE .TRUST IMPLIED 
BY LAW FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
C. FACTS BEFORE THE COURT SHOW AN IN-
COMPLETE AND UNDELIVERED GIFT FROM THE 
PLAINTIFF TO THE PLAINTIFF'S SON, WHICH GIFT 
IS STILL UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE PLAINTIFF 
AND SUBJECT TO PLAINTIFF'S WITHDRAWAL. 
A. FACTS PRESENTLY BEFORE THE COURT 
SHOW A CONSTRUCTIVE MISREPRE.SENTATION 
UPON WHICH A RESCISION MAY BE BASED. 
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In this case the Defendants- rely upon the existence of 
a memorandum and check showing an original agreement 
existing between the Defendants and the Plaintiff, pre-
sumably dated on the 4th day of April, 1958, the date of 
April 4th being determined by the anniversary date of 
the contract~· This date is important to the Defendants 
because it ·shows an ·execution of a -menorandum agree-
ment prior to the date of- April 9, ·1958, which is the date 
of ·the Denfedant's agreement with Eugene Child. Al-
though the· memorandum should have been in the posses-
sion of the Defendants and the check by which payments 
was made to the Plaintiff on the same date should have 
been in the possession of the Defendants, and although 
the same was requested by the Plain_tiff to be p~esented 
in Court for examination of counsel arid the .Court, the 
same was not presented, it ·bemg alleged that said doc~­
ments were lost. Even so, it is ·obvious that the complex 
being. put together on Orchard Drive and ··Virginia Lane 
was a complex of property which to be functional would 
have to .be composed as a unit .. · Any portion· of. the unit 
which was not obtained would substantially lessen the 
value of ~lie entrre property. There is no question but that 
-the 45 foot by_122 foot tract was important to the Defend-
ants. It can therefore be assumed that when Aldin Hay-
ward· approached the Plaintiff Henry Child at his resi-
dence · to negotiate the purchase of the tract · of land 
measuring 122 feet by 209 feet, he did so with the intent 
of purchasing the . entire . tract. Plaintiff Henry Child 
maintained continually that he would not sell the south 
45 by 122 feet to the Defendants. With this knowledge in 
mind, the Defendants nevertheless negotiated a prelimin-
ary memorandum on April 4th, a uniform real estate 
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contract which was changed at the request of the Plaintiff, 
and finally a uniform real estate contract which specific-
ally set out the obligation of the Defendants to deliver a 
certain tract of real property to Eugene Child, the son of 
the Plaintiff. It is significant that there is in evidence an 
agreement ostensibly dated the 9th of April, 1958, be-
tween Eugene Child and his wife, Armilla P. Child, and 
the Defendants, by which Eugene Child and his wife 
agree to convey the 122 feet by 45 feet south tract of land 
-to the Defendants. It is also significant that the Plaintiff 
had various discussions with counsel for the Defendants 
and with the Defendants down to and including the time· 
of the final contract which was executed, only one of these 
conversations was held prior to the execution of the agree-
ment of sale with Eugene Child. Nevertheless, there is 
no evidence any place in the record where irt is alleged 
that either of the Defendants or counsel for the Defend-
ants took the time or the trouble to tell the Plaintiff 
Henry Child about the agreement with Eugene Child 
before the final execution of the contract. 
On page 66 of the record the occasion when the con-
tract. between Henry Child and the Defendants was fin-
ally executed was related, and Wendell Hammond indi-
cates that Coy Hayward had several questions in regard 
t.o th~ contract "because Coy was very particular. He 
wanted to be sure that it was just as intended and asked 
questions, and then he signed, yes." 
Nevertheless, even though Coy Hayward was very 
particular about many ,provisions of the contract, there 
is no evidence in the record to indicate that the subject 
of an agreement with Eugene Child was ever mentioned 
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to the ~laintiff Henry Child before the contract was 
signed. 
This Court has preViously discussed the elements of 
fraud. In the case of Pace, etal, vs. Parrish, etal, ( 1952 
l22l!tah 141) (247 Pacific 2nd 273) the Court specifically 
' - • J 
states: 
"This action being in deceit, based on fraudulent 
misrepresentations, the burden was upon the 
Plaintiff to prove all . of the essential elements 
~her~of. These are: ( 1) that a representation was 
. made, (2)' conce~ning"a presently existing material 
'fact (3) which was false, (4) which the repre-
sentor-either (a) knew to be false or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient know I-
. edge upon which to base such representati_on.(5) 
for the_purpose of inducing th~ other party to act 
ll:POn it; ( 6) t4at the other party ~cting reasonably 
and in ignorance of its falsity (7) did in fact rely 
upon it and (8) was thereby induced to act (9) 
· to his injury and damage." 
In argument before the Lower Court, Defendants 
made much of the necessity of an overt act of .misrepre-
sentation. A· misrepresentation can be by act, by ommis-
sion, or by withholding information where it should in 
-good conscience. be given. 
... \ 
.. In America~ Jurisprudence, Vol. 23 ~raud and De-
ceit, Sec. 24, the general ~ule is stated: 
"Representation may be made orally, by writing, 
or by acts and conduct and arts and· artifices cal-
culated to deceive ... in short ·each·party to a trans-
action must take care not to say or do anything 
tending to impose upon the other and the mode 
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of falsely representing a matter of fact is. im-
material." 
The rule has been specifically applied in Regan vs. 
First National Bank, an. Arizona case of 1940 (101 Pacific 
2nd 214) (55 Arizona 320), in which it was stated: 
"When one under duty to disclose facts to another 
fails to do so, and the other is injured thereby, an 
action in Court lies against a party whose failure 
to perform his duty caused the injury." 
Also in Stuart vs. Phoenix National Bank (62 Pacific 
2nd 101) (39 ALR 3341937) it was stated: 
"Where relation of trust or confidence exists be-
tween two parties so that one places peculiar re-
liance in trustworthiness of another, the latter is 
·under a duty to make full and complete disclosure 
of all material facts and is liable for misrepresenta-
tion or concealment." 
In the instant case, the Defendant Aldin Hayward 
was told many times by the Plaintiff that he would not 
convey the south 122 by 45 feet of land. The Defendant 
knew that it was not the intention of the Plaintiff to part 
with that land to the Defendants. The Defendants were 
made an agent of the Plaintiff for the purpose _of the 
delivery of that land to his son. At the time the uniform 
real estate contract was entered into, which contract is 
dated some time in May, 1958, the agreement evidenced 
by Defendant's Exhibit 9 between the Defendants and 
Euge,ne Child, son of Henry Child, was already in ex-
istence. For the Defendants to execute the uniform real 
·,, 
estate contract with the requirement of conveyance 
clause in it was a tacit admission and agreement to per-
form a task which at that time was impossible of perform-
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ance because of the agreement in exjstence between the 
n·efendants and Eugene Child. This misrpresentation was 
material __ because without the misrepresentation, _Henry 
Child would not have entered into the. sale agreement. 
The Defenda~t intended that the Plaintiff should act upon 
their representation. It is obvious that the Defendants 
w~re ~triving to put together a complex of real-property 
in an' area where a large super ·market might be con-
structed. All of tJ;le repre~~ri~ations m~de. by the Defend-
ants were made for the purpose of obtaining the contract 
v\thich -they have in· their posses.sion. Plaintiff relied on the 
representation madet in the- contract by the Defendants; 
he .had the right to rely qpon it; he .had no r~ason but to 
believe it;.~and he-was injured in that he was deprived of 
the right to dispose of his property according- to his own 
desires. Under the circumstances, to allow the Defendants 
to "'hav~ the benefit of th·eir own wrongdoirig would be in-
equitable and not in accordance with the Law. 
B .. FACTS BEFORE THE COURT SHOW THE 
CREATION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST IMPLIED 
BY. LAW FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
"Where a speciai relationship exists between- the 
p&rties,~· a c9nstructive trust will be created.· A 
. ' . constructive trust is a trust created by the opera-
tion of· Law ·which arises contrary to intention 
·against one who by fraud, .actual or constructive, 
by duress or abuse of.confidence or commission.of 
wrong or. any form of . unconscienable conduct, 
artifice, concealm~nt or questionable means, or 
'who in . any . way against equity and good con-
science has obtained or holds· ·right to property 
which he ought not, in equity and good conscience 
hold and enjoy. This question is raised by equity to 
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satisfy the demands of justice. A breach of con-
fidence, rendering an acquisition of property by 
one person unconscienable against another, raises 
a constructive trust.'' 
(American Jurisprudence Vol. 54 Trusts Sec. 218) 
In Renshaw vs. Tracy Loan and Trust Co. (1935) (87 
Utah 364) ( 49 Pacific 2nd 403) the Court states that: "It 
is the confidential relationship plus the abuse of the con-
fidence thus imposed that authorizes equity to construct 
a trust for the benefit of the party whose confidence has 
been abused." 
The Court further states: 
"It is true that upon any establishment of certain 
fiduciary relationships and transactions between 
the parties to that relationship equity will presume. 
fraud, the abuse of confidence and place the bur-
den of proving good faith and fairness upon the 
dominent party in the relationshrip." 
Oklahoma case, Rees vs. Bruscoe (1957 (315 Pa~ific 2nd 
758) states: 
''A fiduciary relationship exists in all cases where 
there has been a special confidance resposed in one 
who in equity is bound to act in good faith and 
v1ith due regard to interest of one reposing the 
confidence. It arises wherever the trust is specially 
resposed in skill or integrity of another, extends 
to every possible case in which there is a confi-
dance reposed in one side and resulting domina-
tion or influence on the other, and origin of con-
fidence and source of influence is immaterial." 
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·American--Jurisprudence Vol .. 54 -Sec. 225 se~ms to state 
:the. general rule: 
-"'An abuse of (!Onfi~ance renderirig· the- acquisition 
· or rete.n~io:p. o~ p~qperty "Qy one person unc<;>nscien-
able ~gai~_st' _anot~er''sUffi.c~s generally to ground 
equitable relief in the form of a qeclaration ·and 
enforcement -6f a: constructive tnist and the Courts 
- are careful not- to limit the rule or the scope of its 
_applica~ion by a_ ·narrow. definition, of fiduciary 
or-.confi~antial rel~tionships prot~cted by it.'' 
The Defendants,- by virtue of the~r being selected 
and .requested to chold and make conveyance at a future 
date to _th~ party selected by_the Plaintiff would normally 
be prohibited from personal traffic in the-trust estate, and 
a trustee is under a duty to refrain from the private 
applicat_ion or appropri_ation·_ pf-_ttust 'property or funds. 
-· . .. . - .• , . . , 
A t~ust~e ·is ~~ all. t_irn~s q.isabl~d~ from. obtai:q.~ng any 
personal bene!i,t, advantage, gain or. profit out of his ad-
ministration of· a trust; his dealing with-the trust property 
or his relationship'with·thertrust estate.·'Nothing in the 
Law of fiduciary trusts is better.settled than that a trustee 
shall not be allowed, to effect an advantage in dealing with 
the trust estate. Lack of any fraud on the .part of the 
tr\lstee will not validate a transaction having the effect 
o~· rnak_ing_· for himself a _.P!O_fit out of th~ trust estate. 
(Ame:rican Jurisprudence Vol. 54 Sec~ -313) 
Even in the event ·of the. failure of the Courts to·find 
that there was actionable fraud, as set forth in Argument 
No. 1, there is such :a confidantial relationship· and re-
liance on the. part OI t~~ Plaintiff' on 'the Defendants as 
to cause the formation of a constructive trust. The De-
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fendants, then, as trustees of the property which they 
took to convey to the Plaintiff's son were then prohibited 
from dealing in the property which they held as trustees. 
In the event the son of the Plaintiff, Eugene Child, did 
not take the property, or for some reason had become 
unable to take the property, the trust would fail, and 
by Law would then revert to the Plaintiff or the Donor, 
certainly the Defendants who had an interest in acquiring 
the property and were actively pursuing that interest 
and had entered into an agreement with Eugene Child 
before executing the final uniform real estate con~ract. 
On a number of occasions Defendants of their counsel 
could have advised the Plaintiff of their completed nego-
tiations with his son. In view of their knowledge of· his 
stated purpose, the property constituting a gift to his 
son, the failure to disclose on the part of the Defendants 
can only be viewed as a deliberate stategem to obtain 
title to land that could not otherwise be obtained.· 
C. FACTS BEFORE THE COURT SHOW AN IN-
COMPLETE AND UNDELIVERED GIFT FROM THE 
PLAINTIFF TO THE PLAINTIFF'S SON, WHICH GIFT 
IS STILL UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE PLAINTIFF 
AND SUBJECT TO PLAINTIFF'S WITHDRAWAL. 
The Court erred in granting a Decree of specific per-
formance covering the tract of land not being purchased 
by the Defendants. By admission of all the parties in the 
present action ,the Defendants were purchasing for their 
own use and benefit, and had paid consideration for, only 
the property measuring 122 feet by 164 feet. The tract 
measuring 45 feet by 122 feet was included in the descrip-
tion with instructions from the Plaintiff that the same 
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should be delivered to his son at the time a deed was 
made. It is the contention of the Plaintiff that such a 
transaction constitutes the Defendant an agent for and 
in behalf of the Plaintiff for the purpose of carrying out 
Plaintiff's instructions. Instructions were set out on the 
uniform real estate contract as follows: 
"When Buyers receive Deed from the Seller, they 
agree to convey to Eugene Child the south 45" feet 
of the said tract by 122 feet east and west without 
compensation therefor.'' 
Until and unless the agent has performed the function 
of delivering the gift to Eugene Child, the agency, by 
~efinition, may be. revoked and canceled. The agent has 
not been able to effect the gift because the agent has not 
received a conveyance of the property from the Plaintiff. 
In re Galinger's Estate 1948 ( 199 Pacific 2nd 575) 31 
The Court further stated: 
"A gift will not be presumed, but Donor's inten-
tion to make gift must be proved by clear, convinc-
ing strong and satisfactory evidence, and delivery 
of property must be as perfect as the nature of 
property and surroundings of parties will reason-
ably permit." 
The Court further stated: 
"Gifts intervivos and causa mortis must be fully 
executed and there must be intention to transfer 
title to property, delivery by Donor and accept-
ance by Donor." 
In Thatcher vs. Merriam, 1952 a Utah case, (240 Paci-
fic 2nd 266) 121 Utah 191) the Court stated: 
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"The Courts have quite generally held that where 
there is an assignment or conveyance in writing 
that is delivered to the Donor, that the gift is not 
defeated because the gift remains in possession of 
the Donor. It must be remembered that asbetw~en 
Donee and Donor it is not necessary to the validity 
of a gift,. if made by a written instrument trans-
ferring title to the Donee, that possession of the 
property also be delivered to the Donee.'' 
It will be noted, however, that the Court makes the 
distinction in this landmark Utah case between those 
cases wherein the Donor deals directly with the Donee. 
In the instant case at hand, we have a contract between 
tp.e Defendants and the Plaintiff, and by. virtue of this 
contract, the Defendants are required to do certain things, 
at some future date, and there is no delivery to the Donee, 
nor is there delivery by the Donor to the . Donee of any 
written instrument allowing or giving claim to the Donee 
of the property hereunder discussion. 
In the case of Thatcher vs. Merriam and similar cases 
annotated in 63 ALR 537 it is stated as follows: 
"It is almost universally held that a gift by instru-
ment in writing is good without a delivery of the 
property where the instrument is a deed or an 
absolute conveyance." 
The annotation goes on to state that in connection with 
instruments of gift that are not deeds, the question of 
whether delivery of the property is necessary is not easy 
of solution, and further, it is generally held where the 
paper is neither a deed, a sealed instrument nor a formal 
instrument purporting to pass title, but is only an in-
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formal instrument, that it is insufficient to constitute a 
gift without the delivery of the property. It is also signifi-
cant to note that the annotation concerns itself with the 
trans~ctions directly between the Donor and Donee. In 
the instant case, the Donor and Donee have made no 
contact one with another, and one reason that the Donor 
allowed the instant contract to be drawn up was in order 
to have the property eventually given to his son in a 
circuitous route because of bad feelings. between the 
father (Plaintiff) and son. In the instant case, the De-
fendant can only be considered as agent and agents of 
the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff may terminate the agency at 
will. Neither the Defendants nor the Donee have the 
right at Law to force the conveyance of the 45 by 122 
foot strip of property, and until said portion of property 
is actually conveyed and the gift delivered and completed, 
the Plaintiff has the right to withdraw his gift and ap-
propriate it to some other purpose. The decision of the 
Court granting specific performance deprives the Plain-
tiff of this right. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Lorin N. Pace 
Attorney for the Appellant 
Lorin N. Pace 
Attorney at Law 
19 West South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
'~ 
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